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## Origins and Development of West German Military Thought: Vol. I, 1949-1966

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rarely found in a Western publication. It is the nine-page chapter written by Yao Wenbin, a defense analyst for the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China. He presents the Soviet threat as viewed from the Chinese side of the border. It is most enlightening and, in some ways, reassuring.

There are a few gems in this hodge-podge collection of papers, but they are too few to merit more than a cursory glance. Perhaps we could all be spared books like this if another means of providing vacations for academics and government analysts could be developed so they would not feel compelled to justify "conferences" by publishing their "tickets" for attending.

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supported by a steady undercurrent of suspicion of the U.S. strategic role in the Pacific and the accompanying U.S. pressures on Japan to share some corollary role. It does so, however, with too much ardor, citing militarism where it scarcely exists and visualizing re-armed Japan as desiring "to be able to face up to the Soviet Union and to be independent of the United States." Such profound misreadings of Japan, plus more than its share of textual errors, cause one to question the depth of the author's familiarity with Japan. In that sense—while reasonably well-written—the book reads like a research project taken on by someone new to the field and anxious to make it fit a separate agenda brought to bear on it.

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McIntosh, Malcolm. *Japan Re-armed*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 169pp. \$27.50

This is a very pedestrian book on the growth of Japan's postwar defense capabilities. Using mainly secondary sources, it rehashes well-known geopolitical terrain in a manner that is highly sympathetic to advocates of Japan's minimalist defense posture. It is, according to the dust jacket, written by a British journalist working on a doctorate in peace studies. Its prime value (for some) is its clear exposition of antinuclear, antimilitarist, and pro-peace movement sentiments that are

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Lider, Julian. *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought: Vol. I, 1949-1966*. Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1986. 384pp. \$95.50

Julian Lider is best known for his works on *Military Force* (1981) and *Military Theory* (1983). With this new book, he enters the virgin field of West German military thought. In contrast to most recent writers on the topic, who have stressed either the political aspects of the decision to rearm West Germany or the nature and composition of the *Bundeswehr* under the rubric of *Innere Führung*, Lider seeks to answer the question as to whether there exists a distinct

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West German military thought. His response is equivocal at best.

The book is divided into three major parts. In the first, the author seeks to provide a historical analysis of German military thought on the basis of Clausewitz' precepts. According to Lider, today, all that remains valid from Clausewitz is an emphasis on the political nature of war. Put simply, the complex postwar world with its great social and national movements, its revolutionary nuclear missile technology, and its very bipolar nature, have rendered much of Clausewitz archaic.

The second part of the book concentrates on conceptual issues of strategic studies. Here, the limitations of West Germany's geopolitical situation become abundantly clear: while its theoretical planners toyed with strategic concepts involving anticolonial wars, civil wars, and even "covert" wars, hard reality—lack of access to nuclear technology and subordination of national military doctrine to Allied doctrine—dictated the uncritical adoption of NATO doctrinal strategy.

The third theme, and core of the work, is that of military policy as security policy. From the start, there was an inherent incompatibility among Konrad Adenauer's three established goals: security through NATO, integration within Western Europe, and German reunification. Military policy was subordinated to these lofty aims. Yet, ironically, Lider concludes that rearmament, more than anything else, returned West Germany to the ranks of the

European powers. Flexible response to Soviet aggression as well as forward defense, however defined, and limited operations became the principles of NATO doctrine applied to West Germany, which under its Basic Law is prohibited from conducting "offensive" operations. Finally, Lider argues that West Germany cannot yet be judged to possess a specific sociopolitical democratic philosophy; having been created on premises and principles borrowed from the American and British Armies, the *Bundeswehr* could not help but reflect the "far from democratic ideals" of these forces!

Overall, this is a difficult book to digest. Its sociologese jargon—punctuated with abstract constructions such as "spiritual potentialities" and "inter-systemic total war" concepts, to name but two—makes the work rough going. For a German military specialist, Lider is insufficiently aware of recent research on the West German military being conducted by the *Bundeswehr's* Military History Research Center. Quite apart from the author's inability to identify correctly that Center, he seems unaware of two of its major publications in his area: *Militärgeschichte seit 1945: Aspekte der deutschen Wiederbewaffnung bis 1955* (1975), and the projected three-volume semiofficial *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956* (1982 ff.). Any comment on the price of the book would constitute overkill.

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